Master of Roster power of Chief justice has been in controversy for a long time that it has become need of the hour to find out the roots that can endanger the freedom of judiciary.

 Applaud us when we run; Console us when we fall; cheer us when we recover; but let us pass on – for God’s sake, let us pass on.” Justice Sikri once quoted Edmund Burke while expressing his opinion on one of the key issue raised in 2018 that revolved around the term “master of the roster” in the case of Shanti Bhusan v. Supreme Court of India through its registrar and another[1]

On January 12, 2018, a phenomenal event took place which hasn’t taken place ever in throughout the entire existence of any nation when four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court held a public interview with their doubts about the working of the system they were a part of. The essential agenda which was raised in the session were as identified was about with the allocation of cases done by the CJI upon his discretion and to his preferred bench. 

In the Indian and judicial context, the term “master of roster” refers to the administrative power exclusively available with the chief justice of India to decide and allocate the cases that are brought or are pending before the supreme court to his/her fellow judges or puisne judges. As it has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand & Ors[2]: “That the Chief justice is the master of the roster and he alone has the prerogative to constitute benches of the court and allocate cases to the benches constituted, that the puisne judges can only do that work as is allotted to them by the chief justice or under his direction.” And thus this power is exercised with due diligence and importance by chief justice because he is recognized as “first among the equals” which is derived from a Latin term ‘Primus inter pares’ which means all judges of the supreme court have equal judicial power, with chief justice being the senior-most judge. The Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India[3]  even held that “Even though CJ is the head of the judiciary his opinion will only be a consultative one and not a binding one”.

Article 14 and its implication on the administrative power of the judiciary.

The underlying purpose of Article 14 is to treat all persons similarly circumstanced alike, both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Classifications must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are found in all persons grouped together and not in others who are left out, but those qualities and characteristics must have reasonable relations to object of the legislation.[4]

Article 14 bars discrimination and prohibits discriminatory laws. Article 14 is now proving as a bulwark against any arbitrary or discriminatory state action. The horizons of equality as embodied in Article 14 have been expanding as a result of the judicial pronouncements and Article 14 has now come to have a “highly activist magnitude”.[5]

There has been a significant shift towards equating arbitrary or unreasonableness as the yardstick by which administrative, as well as legislative actions, are to be judged. A basic and obvious test to be applied in cases where administrative action is attacked as arbitrary is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness.

The Supreme Court in Sri Srinivasa Theatre v Government of Tamil Nadu[6] 30, that the two expressions ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of law’ do not mean the same thing even if there may be much in common between them. “Equality before the law”, is a dynamic concept having many facets. One facet is that there shall be no privileged person or class and that none shall be above law. Another facet is “the obligation upon the state to bring about, through the machinery of law, a more equal society….. For, equality before the law can be predicated meaningfully only in an equal society. The principle of equality of law thus means not the same law applies to everyone but that law should deal alike with all in one class; that there should be an equality of treatment under equal circumstances. It means “that equals should not be treated unlike and unlikes should not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike.[7]

Article 14 thus means that ‘equals should be treated alike’; it does not mean that ‘unequal ought to be treated equally’.[8] Persons who are in the like circumstances should be treated equally. On the other hand, where persons or groups of persons are not situated equally, to treat them as equals would be violative of Article 14 as this would itself result in inequality. As all persons are not equal by nature or circumstances, the varying needs of different classes or sections of people require different treatment. This leads to classification among different groups of persons and differentiation between such classes. Accordingly, to apply the principle of equality in a practical manner, the courts have evolved the principle that if the law in question is based on rational classification it is not regarded as discriminatory.[9]

 A modern tendency in modern democracies is to confer discretionary power on the government or administrative officers (The Chief Justice while allocating cases discharges administrative function hence he can be called an administrative officer). The power is usually couched in very board phraseology and gives a large area of choice to the administrator concerned to apply the law to actual factual situations.

The failure of check and balance mechanism

In order to ensure that discretion is properly exercised, it is necessary that the statute, or any rulebooks, in question lays down some norms or principles according to which the administrator has to exercise the discretion. Many a time the statues or any rulebook do not do this and leave the administrator free to exercise his power according to his judgment.[10] This creates the danger of official arbitrariness which is subversive of the doctrine of equality. To mitigate this danger the court has invoked Article 14. In course of time, Article 14 has evolved into a very meaningful guarantee against any action of the administration which may be arbitrary, discriminatory or unequal,[11] the very question which arises here is that whether there is any proper check and balances provided for this Roster power which is conferred to the Hon’ble Chief justices/ Chief Justice of India, the Supreme Court of India Handbook Practice and Procedure and Office Procedure as well as the Supreme Court defines Chief Justice as a Chief Justice of India and includes a judge under article 126 of the Constitution to perform the duties of the Chief Justice and vests the power of allocation of cases in the hands of the Chief Justice, the Judges of the Supreme Court are all equal and Chief Justice is the first amongst the equal in all the three Judges cases it was held that the Chief Justice is the head of the Judiciary but also highlighted that his powers must be checked by the senior most brother judges so that his/her opinion is not manipulated by any other external sources although this judgment was for the collegiums system but the judges presiding in the second judges case had thought about such an act.

Conclusion

In the light of the findings, the author would very much like to assert that Master of Roster power of Chief Justice if taken undue advantage of will continue to be in the limelight of several critics where one like me would never fail out to point out the failure of such mechanism because of its violative nature of article 14. Everyone, of course, has different opinions, based on their findings; this one just is a result of my findings and interpretation.



[1] (2018) 8 SCC 396.

[2] (1998) 1 SCC 1.

[3] (1981) 2 SCC 431.

[4] Vikram Cement v. State of MP, (2015) 11 SCC 708.

[5] MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 907 (8th ed., 2018).


[6] AIR 1992 SC 1004.


[7] Gauri Shankar v. UOI, (1994) 6 SCC 349.


[8] M Jagdish Vyas v. UOI, AIR 2010 SC 1596.


[9] Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34.


[10] Supra 19 at 943.


[11] Shrinivasa Rao v. J Veeraiah, AIR 1993 SC 929.


(Aditi Verma is a third year law student from University of Petroleum and Energy Studies)



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