October 20, 2020
E.V. Chinnaiah v.
State of AP and others[1]
is a very
crucial decision regarding the doctrine of pith and substance, where the
Honourable Supreme Court of India interpreted the legislative competence of
Andhra Pradesh to sub-classify the Schedule Castes mentioned in the
Presidential order, under Article 341 of the Indian Constitution.
Justice
Ramchandra Raju was constituted by the State of AP, in 1996, to look into the
statistical data about the various castes, enlisted in the Presidential order,
getting the benefits of reservation in educational and public employment. This
commission concluded that there are wide disparities among several castes
regarding socio-economic, occupational and educational factors. Accordingly, it
recommended sub-categorisation of these castes into four broad groups to
promote equity and equal opportunity of representation among the people from
Schedule Castes.
In
furtherance of these recommendations, the State Government issued a general
order in 1997 for this sub-categorization, which was later substituted by Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes
(Rationalisation of Reservations) Act, 2000.[2] It was challenged in the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh, where the Court ruled in favour of the Act, stating that
there was no violation of Article 341. However, when the same question of
constitutionality of the Act was addressed by the Supreme Court, the five Judge
Bench constituting of N. Santosh Hegde gave judgment for himself and on behalf
of S.N. Variava and B.P. Singh, S.K. Sema and S.B. Sinha, JJ, unanimously
disagreed with the judgment given by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and
declared the act to be ultra vires of the constitution.[3]
This paper
analyses the possible arguments that the Supreme Court should have considered when
they ruled in the favour of the petitioner in this case. It has also been
discussed how the Court neglected some of the important aspects, which directly
affect the people belonging to these communities.
Analysis
of the Judgment
The quasi
federal nature of the division of powers between the Central and State
government entitles the former to have more legislative authority and
competence on several crucial issues, mentioned in the Constitution of India.
In this particular case, it has been argued that the State government
transcended their legislative powers by enacting and implementing the Andhra
Pradesh Castes (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000, which is argued to
be an infringement of Article 341 as the power to amend Presidential list of
Schedule Castes, in any way, resides with President and Parliament. The only
other power that the state is entitled with is to maintain efficiency in
administration to ensure the appointments for people from Schedule Castes as
mentioned in Article 335.[4]
According to the Supreme Court judgment, the State had already been complying
with 15% reservation policy for the Schedule Castes and hence, it was argued
that they shouldn’t have allotted reservations for sub-categorized groups, who
were already in the broad spectrum of existing reservation policy.[5]
The rationale of the judges can be determined to be very similar with what was
decided in Balaji v. State of Mysore,[6]
where the Court discarded the plea for a distinction between Backward Classes
and ‘more’ Backward Classes, which was giving additional reservation to the
latter group apart from the existing reservation for Schedule Castes and
Schedule Tribes because of the sole reason that Article 15(4) does not envisage
the distinction between these two Classes.
However,
according to the researcher, the rationale given by the Honourable judges of the
Supreme Court was not a solitary textual interpretation of the Constitution and
extended the true meaning of Article 341. One can find it intriguing that even
though the Supreme Court accepts that certain sections of the Schedule Castes
are more backward than others,[7]
as their judgments were precisely based on whether the State has powers to
amend the Presidential list, they completely discarded the idea to elevate
these sections from the heterogeneous inequality they suffer within Schedule
Castes. The prominent issue that the Court was concerned about is to determine
whether the State government was competent to bring such Acts. The Doctrine of
pith and substance was used by the judges to identify the scope of legislative
actions of the State. The prime concern of the Supreme Court was to identify
whether there was an infringement of Article 341 by the Andhra Pradesh
government, which empowers the President to make amendments, after taking
consultation from the Governor of that particular state, in the enlisted castes
under Presidential order of Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes. However, it is
very ironic that the Court completely discarded the existence of Article 38
while determining the competency of the State for making provisions for
sub-classification. This particular Article gives the States the authority to
make provisions to secure the social order and promote the welfare of people.
According to Article 38(2), it is the responsibility of the State to strive for
minimizing inequality in incomes, which is not just limited to individuals, but
also to groups of individuals. If not absolute authority, Article 38 vests some
power with the State Government to decide on the policies that directly affect
the public interests of that particular State. Without taking due consideration
of Part IV of the Constitution, which mentions Direct Principles of State
Policy, the Court ignored a vital portion of the Constitution that could have
affected the Judgment, to some extent.
The ambit
of Schedule Castes includes a number of castes and because of differences in
cultural and socio-economic backgrounds, they are broadly termed as a Class in
the context of Article 16(4). However, this doesn’t mean that there are no
heterogeneous differences among these Castes. The OBC conglomeration into two
categories, between less backward and more backward, in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India[8]
can be considered as an appropriate case which makes provisions and reservation
for a more economically backward class, who have been subjected to social
hegemony. This case was not related to the position of SCs and STs and hence,
in the Chinnaiah case it wasn’t dealt in detail. However, the judges
could have juxtaposed the arguments in both the cases and a “casual”
observation[9]
could have been inferred as the dimension for both, Backward Classes and
Schedule Castes remains the same. Languishing homogeneity of communities is a
process of social mobility through education, job, access to political offices,
etc.[10]
This is a natural vertical movement towards social order to elevate oneself from
socio-economic differences existing in society.
When this
case was challenged in Andhra Pradesh High Court, the five judge bench upheld
the constitutionality of the Act by a majority of 4:1. The majority reasoned
that the conglomeration of different castes was done in order to help them
transcend the parochial boundaries where there is no equal representation of a
particular caste in the broader spectrum of Schedule Castes. The Court also
gave the reasoning that the federal system makes the State competent, enough,
to implement the matters regarding access to educational institutions or
services in territorial boundaries of State and it was considered that it’s the
decision of State to decide extent and manner of -preference to be given to the
most backward Schedule Castes to assure the percolation of reservation benefits
equitably. Hence, the Court concluded that the Act was in compliance with
Article 338 and wasn’t in violation of Article 341(2) of the constitution. It’s
not necessary to uphold the superiority of the Union government, especially
when the State government’s provision reflects social justice. An ordinary
citizen believes that federalism will maintain a sense of community and
inter-relationship among the people and serve the importance of human needs if
it is governed by the local government.[11]
The Andhra Pradesh government tried to make some amendments taking cognisance
of the above stated theory. However, it is clear that the Supreme Court
directly rejected it.
One of the
prime reasons behind the Court not considering the Act to be constitutional was
because it was tinkering with the 15% reservation policy. After the division
into sub-groups, these castes would not have been entitled with the whole 15%
reservation policy as individual groups would be having their own percentage of
reservation like Category A had 1%, Category B had 7%[12],
etc. It is evident from the Ramchandra Raju Commission
Report that the castes enlisted in the Presidential List are not operating
homogeneously as the Mala and Adi Andhras are in a better
position than Relli and Madiga castes as the former groups were
having agriculture as their occupational background as compared to the latter
groups, who were confined to being sweepers and scavengers, as their
occupation.[13]
As the former groups are relatively in a better position, they are benefitted
more from reservation rather than the latter groups. This has led to form an
anomaly in the understanding of reservation to Schedule Castes, because of the
existing sub-classifications among these classes. To remove this socio-economic
disparity among the Schedule Castes, the Court should have considered the idea
of separate reservation for more backward groups. Considering heterogeneity
among the Schedule Castes, it can be argued that micro-classification is not
only justified but also necessary in the present social scenario.
In the
similar lines of the rationale given in the Judgment by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, one can argue that federalism has only complementary and not
obstructive role in the context of human rights.[14]
Under Entry 25 and Entry 41 of List III and List II, respectively, the State
government has legislative authority to govern services and education in that
particular State. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the actions of State were
“unconstitutional”, as conveyed in the Judgment. The Seventh Schedule clearly
entitles the State to make provisions regarding public services and education.
Before
determining the validation of the impugned Act, by applying the doctrine of
pith and substance, one needs to identify the meaning of the legislative order.
After determining the meaning of the legislative order, one can simply identify
the constitutionality of the said order.[15]
According to the textual interpretation of Article 341, the powers possessed by
the President are very much limited to inclusion and exclusion of castes and
specify them in the Presidential List and the Union government does not have
any executive or legislative authority beyond that. No particular caste has
been included in or excluded from the Presidential List as the State government
tried to make separate reservations for the people who were not getting equal
representation within the spectrum of Schedule Castes. The judges gave opinion
that there is no mention of sub-classification on Article 341 and hence, the
impugned Act should get discarded.[16]
It is evident that the judges’ interpretation of Article 341 is distorted, to
some extent. The aforementioned Article gives very limited power to the Union
government and specifically classifies the duties of the President regarding
reservation policies. It can be argued that the legislative powers of the State
which are much wider than Union government, regarding this issue.
Conclusion
With
urbanisation, industrialisation and modernisation of society, some amendments
should be made regarding the change in the reservation policies as it is
evident that there are some castes in the State’s Schedule Castes list which
are not getting benefits of reservation. The discretion given by the Court
regarding the interpretation of Article 341 cannot be considered very apt, if
limited one’s reasoning to the textual interpretation. The Supreme Court didn’t
consider the prominence of Article 38, in which states are assigned with the
duty to make provisions that can benefit the citizens and curb socio-economic
inequality prevailing in the society. It’s in the discretion of the State,
according to 15(4) and 16(4), to make provisions and reservations that might
benefit socially backward classes. Hence, one can conclude that it is very
arbitrary to say that the doctrine of pith and substance is accordingly used in
this case.
Instead of supporting the statute, the Supreme Court discarded its applicability. This could have been a revolutionary statute, which could have opened the window for other states to think about their legislative policies regarding the same. It nowhere violated the existing criteria of reservation policy and just sub-divided the existing percentage into few groups, which can be termed necessary by taking cognizance of the scenario that not every deprived caste is able to benefit from the current reservation policy. This statement does not mean that the existing reservation policies are flawed and should be removed, but it just means that the step taken by the State of Andhra Pradesh was innovative and worth consideration.
[1](2005) 1 SCC 375
[2]Ibid [2]
[3]P. Ishwara Bhat, ‘The Means and
Limits of Rationalising Reservation: A Critical Comment on E.V. Chinnaiah v.
State of Andhra Pradesh’ (2010)
[4] Ibid (n 1) [19].
[5]M P Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (Wadhwa and Co, 5th edn, 2004)
[6] 1963 AIR 649
[7]All Answers ltd, 'Reservation Issue on the Right to Equality'
(Lawteacher.net, May 2020)
<https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/reservation-issue-on-the-right-to-equality-constitutional-law-essay.php?vref=1>
accessed 11 May 2020
[8]1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
[9]Jain (n 5).
[10]Yogendra Singh, ‘Social Change in India: Crisis and Resilience’ [1993]
Har-Anand Publications 146.
[11]Stephen Breyer, ‘Does Federalism Make a Difference?’ [1999] Public
Law 651, 662
[12]Ibid (n 1) [2]
[13] Ishwara (n 3)
[14]P. Ishwara Bhat, ‘Fundamental Rights: A Study of their
Interrelationship’ [2004] Eastern Law House 560-561.
[15]Sujit Choudhary, Madhav Khosla and
Pratab Bhanu Mehta, The Oxford Handbook
of the Indian Constitution (1st edn, OUP, 2016)
[16]Ibid (n 1) [13]
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