“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”

               ~ Margaret Mead

Introduction 

Protests are considered to be one of the most effective ways to intrigue public attention. From the day of independence till the present day, significant protests have dominated national as well as international headlines with far-reaching multidimensional outcomes, wherein women protesters have led from the front. A number of protests include the farmers’ protests against the new farm laws and the Shaheen Bagh protests in wake of the controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019. These protests were largely led by women[1] and the immense participation of women, regardless of their age, class or religion was worth capturing. These set of protests have put a spotlight on the important role of women marking it a milestone in the struggle for equality, and leadership of nonviolent movements.

Objurgating the centre’s way of handling the farmers’ protest, the Supreme Court’s three-judge bench on January 11 observed that it will not pass any order regarding the citizens and their right to protest[2]. This was encouraging. But ensuing remarks by the Chief Justice of India S.A. Bobde has created a matter of concern. As an emphasis was added by him regarding:

 

“Why are women and elders to be kept in the protest?”

 

He also asked one of the senior advocates to sway the women and elderly protesters and to ask them to go back from the protest sites. These remarks from the Chief Justice of India irks the question- Can there be a ‘custodian’ at a given protest site so as to decide who should be ‘kept’ there and who should not be? Such a stance questions the role of women in a protest. These set of remarks gain much importance as they were made with reference to a fundamental right, the right to protest, which is regarded as the pillar of any vibrant democracy. 

 

Right to Protest: The Domestic backdrop

 

Part III of the Indian Constitution provides for the lists of rights which are fundamental in nature. However, the word “Protest” has not been defined anywhere in the constitution. Apart from providing these rights having a fundamental character, Article 19 also mentions certain restrictions which authorities may impose on such rights. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the citizens the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. 

The freedom of speech under Article 19 is given to the citizens to make sure their participation in public activities. They may form an opinion and can have a word to say in public activities. This is the reason why it is regarded as an important aspect for any democracy. A person may express his views on any relevant issue or point of contention through any medium which he wishes. These set of rights in other sense constitutes our public as well as political freedom. The right to speech and expression transfigures into the freedom to express opinion on the various practices of the government. The right to speech and expression becomes the right to association for political purposes so as to collectively challenge the government’s decisions and to even aim, peacefully and legally the abuse of power. This is the foundation of our democratic system where in the citizens of the country are a valuable asset and they assist in creating a system that thrive for the betterment of its people.After understanding the essence of rights, it can be said that they not only represent the democratic values of India but also signifies the importance in any democratic regime.

Overall, the citizens have Right to protest on one hand whereas authorities are empowered to impose limitations on such protests on the other hand. The thing is those limitations must be reasonable in nature[3]. The right to peaceful protest must be respected but the idea is ‘no right is absolute’ i.e. one has a corresponding responsibility for the acts committed by him.

 

Public Demonstrations and the Rule of Law

 

The right to freedom of expression and public demonstration is one of the primary features of any democratic structure and the undermining of freedom of expression unswervingly affects the central nerve of the democratic system. The right to peaceful public demonstration is not merely a civil right which is subject to reasonable restrictions but is an appearance of uncertainty as due to various outcomes involved.

The term “public order” under Article 19(2) is a legitimate ground of restriction and it can be sensible only when there are certain evidences that the protesters had incited lawless or rebellious acts, or these acts may result in their further happenings in the possible time. Further, the freedom to assemble and public demonstration, bounds to impede the ordinary rights- one of them being the right to freedom of movement and these set of protests may cause a certain level of disarray to ordinary life and encounter supplementary aggression. The protesters in case may block roads, occupy public spaces, and cause disturbance or even can harm the public assets- for this the authorities may find it necessary to prevent or regulate such behaviour. The courts, as being part of the state, can’t be oblivious of their duty to safeguard this right[4]

Further, the apex Court in the landmark judgement of Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India[5], observed that, it is clear that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the process of democracy, the government being of the people, for   the people and by the people and enabling him/her to intelligently exercise his right of creating a choice, free and general dialogue of public matters is absolutely essential.

In Romesh Thappar v. The State Of Madras[6], the Hon’ble Court observed that the security of a State is a reasonable restriction under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. However, the words used in the impugned article are ‘public order and safety’. The Court further held that the 2 terms have to be read together so as to define the purpose for which restrictions were allowed for the wider purpose of public order.

 

In particular, all the cases are judged on their own virtue and facts, and over the years it has broadened the scope of freedom of expression and public demonstration. There is no widespread or accurate or conventional standard that can be considered but reasonable restrictions mentioned in the constitution [Article 19(2) – Article 19(6)] can only monitor the law.

              

Women’s Symbolization in Public protests

A typical stereotype with regards to the perception of protests is that- As men are at the forefront of clashes with the law enforcement authorities the patriarchal norms must traditionally exclude women. This assumption principally becomes problematic when the cause for a particular protest is revolving around the rights and lives of women, as was in the case of farmers’ protest. Another thing is the designation of spaces for protests. As the public space is occupied by men, women and members of the LGBTQ+ community as well, the court must opine about the collective role of every member of the community with regards to their dissent.

The problem with this view is that the Court seems to outlook the public spaces as gender- neutral spaces, but the reality is that public spaces are acutely gendered in nature[7]. Further, the phrase like “women are kept in the protests” underrates their potential and contributions in the agricultural sector.

In order to understand the imperative role of women in protests, one has to go through the gendered dimensions in details. For this, the series of three Articles - 14, 15 and 16 have a key role in addressing the Constitutional Right of a person. Article 14 of the Constitution of India comprehends that- "The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”.Further, Article 15 endows the protection with respect to discrimination by the State on the grounds of cast, race, religion, birth, etc. The first of two significant phrases in Article 14 is "equality before the law", which means among equals, the law must be equal and equally administered as well[8]. Talking about the role of women in any protest-the movement is not only made up of women, but also men who work and fight equally to safeguard the public interest. There have been many women leaders who have played a key role in local or world history but, the problem is that despite the socital progress in terms of legal safeguard and equal rights, women still assume a lower-status in a traditionally patriarchal society like ours. To get around the 'negative concept' problem, the phrase "no person should be denied equality before law" was added later[9]. This is a 'affirmative concept' which means no individual or person can be excluded from securing the equal protection of the law and, for that reason, special laws can be framed to help the disadvantaged groups and other members of society.

According to Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution freedom of speech and expression is regarded as a fundamental right given to its citizen against the state, which includes carrying out the peaceful public demonstration, so it can be aptly presumed that a protester’s right can only be exercised within the bounds of citizenship. Thus, it becomes important to examine the scope of citizenship through the lens of gender as well. When the protesting women are asked to return from public spaces wherein their interests and rights are at stake, their status as subordinate citizens is magnified. If there is equality with regards to claiming of rights, then why would they be singled out when it comes to women who are asked to return as if those sorts of protests did not concern them as it did men? 

This quote also questions the presence of women at protest sites where issues concerning the common good or public interest are involved. In the case of farm laws, the presence of women raises concern specifically due to the fact that their interests are portrayed as gendered specific with regards to occupying the public spaces and engaging with the State. But, the thing is citizenship is not merely a passive concept but is also an active conception[10], which goes beyond mere status and formal rights (of equality) and ought to be viewed as a relationship that promotes agency and participation, which is why women’s presence at protest sites ought to be welcomed and not questioned.

  

Conclusion

After one goes through the past happenings it can be said that the mobilization of poor women and those from marginalized communities are originally intended to address the outcomes of failed state-led development systems rather than directly dealing with gender injustices. However women’s participation in both these movements resulted in an increased awareness of gender injustices and the importance of female. Even when a women’s rights concern has been identified, women’s’ groups have demonstrated different strategies of political participation.

Although women are increasingly participating to challenge the existing understandings of gender roles, the path to gendered equality in India would be long and arduous. There is a need to create a strong and sustainable alliance among women’s rights group that could lead to future improvements for women’s rights in India.

(Mayank Shyamsukha is a 3rd year student of Institute of Law, Nirma University)


[1]  M R Shamshad, Tale of two protests, The Indian Express, (January 25, 2021, 8:38 PM), available at https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/farmers-protests-caa-citizenship-act-stir-7161330/

[2]  Krishnadas Rajagopal, SC says it intends to stay farm laws, The Hindu (January 11,2021, 12:51 PM), available at https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sc-farmers-protest-farm-laws/article33548219.ece

[3] Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324

[4] V. Venkatesan Supreme Court’s Shaheen Bagh Judgment Will Lead to Fresh Curbs on Right of Peaceful Protest, The Wire (October 08,2020 00:00 hours) available at https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-shaheen-bagh-judgment-fresh-cubs-right-of-peaceful-protest

[5] Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

[6] Romesh Thapper v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124

[7]Rajkarnikar, R., 2021. Gender perspective : neutral public space. [online] Cardinalscholar.bsu.edu. Available at: https://cardinalscholar.bsu.edu/handle/123456789/193375

[8]Lachmandas v. State of Bombay, 1952,  S.C.R. 710 (726)

[9] Stephen’s college v. university of Delhi, 1992 1 SCC 558: AIR 1992 SC 1630: 1991 Supp (3) SCR 121

[10]Plato.stanford.edu.2021. Citizenship, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy/Fall 2017 Edition. [online] Available at: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/citizenship/> [Accessed 3 September 2021].


Federalism is the key strength of constitution and government structure in India.While drafting the constitution the word “union” was chosen rather than the word “federation”just to show that the people may be divided into different states for convenience of administration but the country is one integral whole, its people a single people living under a single imperium derived from a single source.[1] But there are many ways of transforming a federal system into a unitary one, the simplest way is by proclaiming emergency. Even after including federalism in a part of basic structure[2], the central government by taking unfair benefit under part XVIII of the Indian Constitution has violated the basic structure of the government administration. One of the provisions included in this part is state emergency, Articles 356 and 357 of the Constitution offer certain measures for dealing with a condition that arises from a state's constitutional machinery failing.[3]

In this article we will discuss about the provisions of state emergency and instances of misuse and what is the Supreme Court’s perspective on this.

FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MACHINERY IN STATE

In the words of Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar “such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter.”[4]Even after the constitution makers declared it a dead letter, the central government has repeatedly used and abused it in their own favor. Article 356 provides for proclamation of state emergency on the satisfaction of president on the drastic situation of state where it can be functioned according to law.

CONTROVERSY OVER INCLUSION OF “OTHERWISE”

Article 356 includes proclamation on the basis of “governor’s report”on failure of state administration to the president’s or “otherwise”.[5] H.V. Kamath, an Indian Politician has criticized the word ‘otherwise’ and said only god knows what this ‘otherwise’ means.[6]

What happens, however, if the Governor declines to recommend initiative under Article 356? Because of these circumstances, the framers of the constitution added the words “or otherwise” to Article 356(1). As also stated by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar that:

“We must give liberty to the President to act even when there is no report by the Governor and when the President has got certain facts within his knowledge on which he thinks fit to act in the fulfilment of his duty”.[7]

As also stated by Supreme Court that “whenever the said satisfaction is required of the President or the Governor, it should be in the constitutional sense and not otherwise”.[8]

So, from the above discussion, it can be concluded that the inclusion of “otherwise” is necessary but due to inclusion of this particular word it is on the sole discretion of the president who,under article 74 of Indian Constitution, act on the advice of the council of ministers to impose state emergency under article 356 or not.

NO DEFINITE BOUNDARIES

As discussed in the previous topic, it is on the sole discretion of the government to invoke article 356 in a state or not. It has no definite boundaries like mentioned in Article 352 other than moral conscience of the bench.

While Article 352 can only be invoked in three cases of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion, Article 356 applies at any time when constitutional machinery collapses in a state in number of ways, including political breakdown in the state, the inability of a stable ministry to hold public office, the breakdown of law and order, corruption or misuse of its authority,subversion of constitution or of the democratic social fabric, etc.[9]

D.D. Basu made the distinction as one being the response to the existence of state and other being response to the dissolution of constitutional machinery in a state.[10]

Article 356 has given wide scope in order to maintain law and order situation in a state but the central government has molded it to take advantage and remove the rule of opposite party government sometimes in some states.

INSTANCES OF USE AND MISUSE

Article 356 has been misused several of times like in 2002 the president’s rule imposed in the state of Uttar Pradesh on the report of the governor, who didn’t even pay heed to the actual situation going in UP. Other similar instances arisein 1953 in Pepsu, in 1954 in Andhra,in 1951 in Punjab, in 1956 in Travancore-Cochin and in 1961 in Orissa, in all these situations Governor of the respective state on unreliable sources and without taking into consideration the actual situation of state made its report and the president based on that report, imposed state emergency.[11]

Another dramatic instance happened in 1977, after the 1975 emergency people’s anger came out and congress lost the general election and overtaken by the Janata Party, which later dissolved all congress ruled state at that time under President’s rule. History repeated itself in 1980 where congress again emerged as the majority and dismissed the Janata government from 9 states under article 356. These proclamations were highly questioned as they were not based on any Governor’s report as also observed by Sarkaria commission that -

“these all cases are typical instances of wholesale misuse of article 356 for political purposes, extraneous to the one for which the power has been conferred by the constitution”[12]

Wade and Forsyth[13] also criticizes the political nature of the decision making where courts are incapable of taking any cognizance of misuse of power.

Untilthe year 2000, article 356 has been invoked as many as 100 times. In present day, it seems difficult to use the power under article 356 as the NDA government enjoys majority in the LokSabha but lacks the majority in Rajya Sabha.

JUSTICIABILITY OF THE PROCLAMATION UNDER ARTICLE 356

Judicial review under article 356 was first came up under consideration in KK Aboo v. UOI, where thewrit petition challenging the center's proclamation was dismissed by the Kerala High Court.[14]Again, in Rao Birinder Singh v. The Union of India, the court ruled that it has no jurisdiction to question president’s satisfaction and don’t even have authority to make him disclose the material on which he formed his satisfaction.[15] In Jyotirmoy Bose v Union of India, the Calcutta High Court rejected writ petition challenging president’s proclamation issued under article 356. The court also rejected the contention of petitioner that president should act on his own discretion and not on the advice of council of ministers while proclamation of emergency.[16]

Bijayananda Patnaik v President of India[17] is anextremely informative decision on article 356 given by Orissa High Court, where the court ruled that the governor must act independently, not with the assistance and advice of the ministers, when sending his report to the president.  And that report cannot be challenged in a court of law, whether it is false or based on fictitious evidence.Because of the governor's immunity under Article 361(1) of the Constitution, it is not justiciable.[18]

The court also recommended that, upon the collapse of the ministry, the governor should ask the opposition leader to form the government. also, the governor should not be concerned with whether or not the opposition government will be stable in the future.[19]

The Andhra Pradesh High Court also asserted that the satisfaction of the presidentwas not a justiciable matter.[20] (Para 15).

The matter of doubt was cleared by the Constitution (thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975, which declared that the ‘satisfaction’ of president “shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any court on any ground”.[21]However, the constitution's Forty-fourth Amendment later repealed this provision.

RAJASTHAN V. INDIA[22]

The matter was heard by a seven-judge constitutional bench after the State of Rajasthan (along with several other states) filed an original suit under Article 131 challenging the Union of India's invocation of Article 356 in these states. The court's general stance is that it will not intervene with the center's exercise of power under article 356 solely because it encompasses "political and executive policy and expediency unless any constitutional provision was being violated."[23]

And, under article 356(5), the court cannot investigate or challenge the president's satisfaction on any basis unless and until it is shown that the president used "patent abuse of this clause or an excess of authority on admitted facts" on grossly perverse and irrational grounds.[24]

Bhagwati J, emphasizedthat –

“The satisfaction of President under article 356 is ‘subjective and cannot be tested by reference to any objective test’ or by ‘judicial review’. But if it can be shown that there is no satisfaction of the president at all, the exercise of the power under article 356(1) would be constitutionally invalid”.[25]

Most of the justices said that if the satisfaction is not genuine or is based on completely irrelevant and superfluous grounds, the court has authority to investigate it because there would be no satisfaction of the president in the matter in which he is expected to be satisfied.

SR BOMMAI[26]

The great significance of this case can be gauged from the fact that the Supreme Court had to decide the validity of six promulgation issued in six different state arising due different scenario’s ranging from ram janmbhoomi-babri demolition to defection of ministers.

Seven opinions were rendered by a nine-judge bench that considered the different issues raised in these cases. On the basis of the judges' consensus, the following key propositions can be stated:

The majority of chief minister in the house will be determined on the floor of the house, not in governor’s chamber overruling the Karnataka High Court’s order in the Bommai case.[27]

Rather than blatantly writing the letter to the president, the governor should first try to explore the possibility of establishing an alternative ministry.[28]

The president should declare a state of emergency based on some material evidence that the state government cannot function in accordance with the law. The validity of content can also be challenged in court.[29]

The satisfaction cannot be challenged if based on such valid material.

The legislative assembly's dissolution is not an inevitable or mandatory result of the proclamation's issuance. It can only be used when it is absolutely necessary to accomplish the proclamation's goal. Article 356(3) makes it illegal to dissolve the assembly until the parliament approves the proclamation.[30]

If the proclamation is declared unconstitutional by the court notwithstanding the parliament's approval, the president's decision is rendered null and void.[31]

In Bommai, the Supreme Court, by showing its judicial creativity, aims to promote a set of fundamental constitutional principles like parliamentary system, secularism, federalism and control over the executive.

The court stated that power conferred under article 356 is not an absolute power but a conditioned power. The court went on to say that a state government may enjoy a majority in the assembly, but if it subverts the basic value of secularism, it can be dismissed under Article 356(1).[32]

(Vishal Singh is 2nd year student of Rajiv Gandhi National University of law, Patiala)


[3]Shetty, President’s Power under Article 356 of the Constitution-Theory and Practice, in ILI, Constitutional Developments Since Independence, 335 (1975), ILI, President’s Rule in the States; Report of the Sarkaria Commission.

[4]Constitutional Assembly Debates, India, available at: http://loksabhaph.nic.in/writereaddata/cadebatefiles/C04081949.html. (Visited on April 28, 2021).

[5]The Constitution of India, art. 356.

[9]M.P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law 742 (LexisNexis, Haryana, 8th edn., 2020).

[10]DD Basu, Commentary on the Constitution of India, (LexisNexis, 8th edn., 2011).

[11]Supra Note 9.

[12]Report, 175, pg. 18.

[13]Wade William and Christopher Forsyth, Administrative Law, 420-421, (Oxford University Press, England, 9th ed.).

[14]KK Aboo v. UOI, AIR 1965 Ker 229.

[15]Rao Birinder Singh v. The Union of India and Ors., AIR 1968 P&H 441.

[16]Jyotirmoy Bose v Union of India, AIR 1971 Cal 122.

[17]Bijayanand v President of India,AIR 1974 Ori 52.

[18]Ibid, at 15.

[19]Ibid, at 25.

[21]the Constitution (thirty-eighth Amendment) Act, 1975.

[23]Ibid, at 28.

[24]Ibid, at 7.

[25]Ibid, at 10-11.

[27]Ibid, at 127-128.

[28]Ibid, at 277.

[29]Ibid, at 2.

[30]Ibid, at 48.

[31]Ibid, at 124.

[32]Ibid, at 219. 


 

The “Basic Structure Doctrine” is the most potent tool in the hands of the judiciary to maintain and check the balance of power that is required for the smooth functioning of the Indian Democracy. Legal systems always have a hierarchical normative order (1-wh). Each system in such an order always derives it authority from a system above it in hierarchy. A constitution whether written or unwritten, contains the norm of exalted authority and hence, is of the highest importance in any legal system. The constitution lives the closest to the “basic” norm of the legal system and derives its nature and character from it. (7-wh) This “basic” structure is the identity of a legal system and it is not desirable for elapses of time to sweep away its essential features. Recent literature calls for the codification of the basic structure doctrine, in an attempt to define its limits and effectively try to reduce the lack of judicial accountability that lies with its use.

The objective of this paper is to argue against its codification and propose some better alternatives. I will show how a codified doctrine has a theoretically unjustifiable form and would bring along numerous adjudicatory pitfalls. 

Every single feature of this doctrine was developed to address a situation that arose before the court in a particular case. Keshavnanda[i] never provided any affirmative theory about how the basic structure doctrine is to be discerned beyond a Potter Steward-esque view.[ii] Justice Chandrachud, in Indira Gandhi v Raj Narain[iii], promulgated the non-exhaustive nature of the doctrine in saying that "the theory of Basic Structure has to be considered in each individual case, not in the abstract, but in the context of the concrete problem.” Codification of the basic structure doctrine would be a potential threat to its legitimacy. This would be caused by a lack of conceptual crystallization of the doctrine’s elements and its potentially arbitrary use by the judiciary. I will also highlight a theoretical limitation of codifying the doctrine through legislative amendment.

I argue that firstly, it is not possible for the judiciary or parliament to predict all possible situations that would arise and must be protected by the doctrine. We still do not know if all what is considered to be basic today is conceptually crystallised.

The exact contents of this doctrine are not yet laid out conclusively. The way it has evolved has upset some major philosophical assumptions about legislative sovereignty and the boundaries of constitutional authority.[iv] The foundations of this doctrine have been built upon profound deliberation over multiple cases before attaining crystallization. It is likely that certain elements are still in this process and will move towards finality as individual cases would require its use over time. If at a certain instance, the doctrine is codified, it is possible that firstly, some elements would be left out and secondly, some that have not fully developed, be included. Let’s take the example of Judicial Review. If codification occurred immediately after Indira Gandhi, then Judicial review would not have been a part of the doctrine. The situation then created in Minerva Mills[v] would face great difficulty. Either the court would have to invoke it as an unwritten principle, making the initial process of codification futile, or have the legislature add it to the code, which would be impossible given the political situation. The unwritten nature provided the Supreme court with room for a “self-styled benchmark of structural essentialism” [vi] that helped judicial review become a part of the basic structure when required. This power has been the centre of much debate and the proponents of codification seek to define its limits. Codification, however, will lead to more problems. It will cause the arbitrary use of the basic structure doctrine. A misguided illusion of clarity, generally associated with codification principles, will only amplify these issues.

Courts bind themselves by precedent so as to prevent arbitrary and inconsistent decision making. A written doctrine will allow a court to depart from judicial precedent by invoking the written text as a generically valid reason and hence, weaken the “judicial commitment to stare decisis.[vii] Two features of a codified doctrine could be the reason for this claim. Firstly, the existence of an authoritative code would give definitive answers to questions of constitutionality. This would be explicitly expressed by the codified doctrine. Now, the second feature – the doctrine’s status as essential unamendable law would give possibly baseless interpretations by the judiciary, ratification. The court can insist that it is merely executing what the code dictates. Of course, the degree of this insulation would depend on the abstraction and generality of the codified doctrine. The constitution of Honduras has a highly specific eternity clause that dictates the character of the government.[viii] The 2009 Honduran Constitutional Crisis can be thought of as a direct result of the presence of such a specific dicta that blurred boundaries between rules and principles.[ix]The avenue to depart from precedent and such judicial insulation may not just encourage arbitrary behaviour, but also intellectual sloppiness and an opportunity for judges to pursue personal political agendas.[x]

Proponents believe that codification will provide clarity about the limits on legislative action.[xi] However we must understand that the meaning of many substantive principles, when formulated in a normative context- are inherently unclear. The political concepts associated with words such as “equality” and “liberty” are highly contested.[xii] Codification will present such contested concepts as clear and indisputable. This would only create and illusion of clarity and solidify the aura of judicial opinion that tries to define it, having negative consequences on any judicial or even societal debate over the content of such principles.[xiii]

One of the biggest problems faced by any legal system is to balance itself between maintaining stability and continuity on one hand, and flexible and responsiveness on the other. The form of the constitution, and more remarkably, of the basic norm that sustains it, plays a deterministic role in its position between these two extremes. The form of a codified foundation fails to strike the right balance mentioned above. An unwritten basic structure doctrine will find a better balance between this much required stability, and the need for some malleability to adapt to the changing needs of society. It does this as the uncodified elements respond to “policies and concerns of a society in an organic, diffuse manner without any compromise of stability.”[xiv]

Although not directly related to adjudication, I want to address the theoretical baselessness of having the legislature codify the basic features of a constitution. The 15th Amendment Act[xv] in Bangladesh, constitutionalized the essential features of their constitution and explicitly confirmed the limited amending power of the legislature. According to the ‘delegation theory’, “limitations upon the delegated secondary constituent power can solely be imposed by the higher authority from which it is derived – the primary constituent power.”[xvi] The validity of an unamendable doctrine codified by the legislature would be threatened when faced by a conflicting norm created by the same authority. Such codification, therefore, would be administered by the maxim – “lex posterior derogat priori”. The Bangladeshi Amendment was criticized by constitutional theorists who founded their claim on this maxim, arguing that a constitutional amendment cannot establish its own unamendibility. An implicit or unwritten doctrine would naturally come into existence for maintaining the legitimacy of such aamendment, making the initial process of codification theoretically futile. A national referendum could help in legitimizing such a code without an unwritten interpretation but conducting a fair referendum to know the true ‘will’ of the people would face some serious practical problems in the context of India.[xvii]

Many misjudgements have been woven into the unwritten doctrine that have caused critics to advocate for its explication. The doctrine has often been invoked in situations when the meaning of the subject constitutional norm has several reasonable interpretations. It is possible that judges link their own cores of jurisprudential understandings on questions of basic structure, even when reasonable minds might differ in opinion.[xviii] The lack of constitutional accountability and restraint has cause people to advocate for its codification and consequently, the explication of its limitations.

It is well received that its reins cannot be let loose without any accountability. However, for striking the right balance between restraining ‘constitutional’ procedures used to achieve unconstitutional ends and the unnecessary, baseless or overt use of this doctrine, codification is not the answer. Maybe two possible solutions exist.

Instead of codifying the doctrine and limiting its resilience against the unpredictable challenges posed by the various routes of action that can be adopted by anti-democratic actors, an approach where courts are influenced by democratic principles rooted in constitutional systems beyond the borders of its own jurisdiction, can be considered. The expansion of this idea would go beyond the scope of this paper.

The reformation of judicial review can also be explored. The doctrine was created in special circumstances to protect the fundamental structure of the constitution.  However, today, the unnecessary and excessive use of the doctrine is a reality that threatens its very special character.  It has been “extensively invoked to affect policy decisions”[xix] and its indifferent evocation has been the root cause of resentment against it. Explication or codification of the doctrine is, again, not the answer to limit such use. Rather, the process of judicial review needs to be restructured in a way that protects the basic features of the constitution against infringing laws without the actual invocation of the doctrine itself. This argument derives its strength from the understanding that any law which violates the basic nature of the constitution, would also, in most likelihood, be inconsistent with some other part of the constitution. This particular law could breach some fundamental right or some other constitutional provision which does not necessarily mean that the law is violative of the basic structure. In such a scenario, the judiciary must use the lower principle to invalidate the law. In other words, a law that is expected to infringe the basic structure, should not pass the judicial scrutiny of an applicable constitutional provision. The repeated use of the doctrine will not just impair it but also motivate institutions to bypass its moral authority.[xx]The restructured judicial review process can prevent this, without the need for codification and its associated issues. 

It must be noted that the core of both these opinions revolve around the willingness to trust the judiciary and the application of their discretion in protecting the Constitution of India. It would be a stretch of our imagination to believe that the decisions of a court fall neither towards the constitution not towards the ‘consent of the governed’.[xxi]The case against the doctrines codification far outweighs its benefits, especially in the light potential solutions for the shortcomings of an uncodified basic structure doctrine.


[i] AIR 1973 SC 1461

[ii]Jacobellis V. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., Concurring).

[iii]1975 AIR 1590

[iv]Satya Prateek, Today’s Promise, Tomorrow’s Constitution: ‘Basic Structure’,

Constitutional Transformations and The Future of Political Progress In India, 1 NUJS L. Rev. 417 (2008)

[v]1980 AIR 1789

[vi]Supra 3

[vii]Pek, Jane. (2008). Things Better Left Unwritten? Constitutional Text and The Rule of Law. New York University Law Review (1950). 83.

[viii]Honduras Const. Article 374

[ix]Friedman, A. (2011). Dead Hand Constitutionalism: The Danger of Eternity Clauses in New Democracies.

[x]Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory 264 (1999).

[xi]William E. Nelson, Americanization Of the Common Law 90 (1975)

[xii]Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 781, 800 (1989)

[xiii]F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order 86 (1983). 107

[xiv]Supra 7

[xv]Bangladesh Const. (Fifteenth Amend.) Act, 2011.

[xvi]Roznai, Y. (2013). Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 61(3), 657-719. Retrieved from Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/43668170

[xvii]Excerpt from Y. Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments – The Limits of Amendment Powers, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017 (Part Ii, Ch. 4, 5).

[xviii]Rosalind Dixon, David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and A Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 606–638

[xix]Supra 3

[xx]Supra 3

[xxi]Levinson, S. (1995). Responding To ImperfectionThe Theory And Practice Of Constitutional Amendment. (Course Book Ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press. 


 (Avantika Rai is a student of OP Jindal Global Law University)


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